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One of the most challenging problems to applied industrial economists is the 
detection of colluding behavior in oligopolistic markets. In this paper we postulate how 
low market share variability may be used as a primary indicator of cartel success to 
maintain the agreed upon levels of production, after controlling from exogenous 
fluctuations in the economic environment and the market structure. To test this 
hypothesis we use a unique data set consisting of government-sanctioned cartels in 
Sweden from 1976 to 1990. The use of a measure of share stability is shown to be an 
interesting and potentially informative statistic for making comparisons when the cartel 
agreement is in effect and when it is absent. The conclusion supports our hypothesis that 
horizontal price fixing cartels are significantly associated with a lower instability than in 
its absence. The normative implication of the paper is that a measure of market share 
variability may provide a basic framework for antitrust authorities to call for attention 
on the possible existence of tacit collusion in industries with similar market structure 
but significant differences in market share stability.  





The problem of detection of colluding behavior in oligopolistic markets is an 
issue actively subject to both theoretical and empirical research by industrial economist, 
because the associated restrictive practices result in a misallocation of resources and a 
loss of social welfare as compared to the competitive solution. This is the reason why 
antitrust authorities laws condemn practices in restrain of trade or commerce, and 
antitrust agencies have been created to prosecute this kind of conspiracies
1. There are a 
number of structural conditions that facilitate collusion, and therefore whenever we find 
markets in which these conditions are present we may conclude that it is conducive to 
collusion. Industrial organization theorist have identified among other factors product 
homogeneity, because it requires a less complex price structure to agree upon, fewness 
of sellers, because it reduces the coordination problem, high concentration, because it 
raises the awareness of mutual interdependence, and demand elasticity, the lower the 
elasticity of demand the higher the profits from increasing the price above the 
competitive levels, industry maturity, and concentration, that makes a market conducive 
to collusion. Thus, we should expect collusion to take place most often when these 
conditions are present. Despite the fact that these circumstances may play a relevant 
role
2, and are used by antitrust authorities to guide their actions, we propose a 
complementary approach based on market share variability. We will see how this 
approach can be used as a primary indicator of colluding behavior in oligopolistic 
markets. 
Cartels face two kinds of problems, one is internal, and the other one is external. 
One of the internal problems of collusive behavior is in the distribution of the gains 
from participation, i.e. the sharing problem. Putting to one side the possibility of 
                                                 
1 The US antitrust law was born in 1890 after the congress passed Sherman Act (1890). Following with 
the dissatisfaction for the lack of effectiveness of the act, new laws were passed on like the Clayton act 
and the Federal Trade Commission. The American law condemns per se any restriction to competition. In 
Europe the legal body was unified after the formation of the Union, the directions are compiled in articles 
81 through 86 of the European Union treaty. The European legal framework distinguishes between those 
agreements that restrain competition and is efficiency enhancing and those that are not. Both legal 
systems have enforced exemptions to their antitrust laws. The exceptions are applied to those cases in 
which the public interest demands some coordination among firms to achieve it. 
2 See Hay and Kelley (1974), Palmer (1972), and Fraas and Greer  
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collusive price discrimination, one would expect successful collusion to restrict output 
to a lower level than would otherwise occur. The temptation of individual firms to 
deviate and increase their own profits by expanding their own output while others 
contract is a problem that successful collusion must solve, that is the problem of 
deterring cheating or non-compliance. If the ex-post profits were redistributed among 
the firms, this would reduce the temptation of ex-ante deviation. In the absence of ex-
post redistribution of profits and informative market price on collusive behavior
3, some 
market sharing arrangement appears a natural way to share the profits from collusion. 
The observation of a market price by itself tells us little about the 
competitiveness of the corresponding industry unless we observe prices in industries 
with similar cost structures. If we are able to accurately measure the marginal cost of the 
firms then we can estimate the price-cost margin and assess the state of competition in 
the industry. The temporal pattern of the industry price-cost margin might reveal 
changes in the competitive structure of the market. The price is subject to changes in the 
demand conditions, and the cost function of the firms change over time with innovation 
and the fluctuation of the price of the inputs. The main problem is that estimations of 
the marginal cost are rather complicated. 
Cartels also face an external problem, namely the prediction of the production 
levels by domestic outsiders and, especially in the case of small open economies by 
foreign producers
4. If the competitive fringe represents a small fraction of the total 
supply in the market then the external problem is alleviated, otherwise it should be 
considered as a source of potential instability. The existence of a significant competitive 
fringe increases the pressure on the collusive agreement. 
                                                 
3 That seems to be the case in the Swedish cartel data used in the paper as we describe in section 3. 
Studies of the evidence of price increase around cartel formation and price decrease around cartel 
dissolution have not been entirely satisfactory; see Fölster and Peltzman (1997). Ciarreta (2000) finds 
significant evidence of price increase around horizontal formations and price decrease around cartel 
termination. In any case the econometric results are stronger for output changes around changes of cartel 
status. 
4 For a discussion see Jacquemin et al. (1980) in which they estimate a structural model of profitability 
for a data set of manufacturing industries in Belgium that incorporates foreign trade issues. They 
conclude that for small open economies neither total nor domestic concentration ratios are valuable 
indicators of market power for industries deeply involved in export and import competition. Stålhammar 
(1993) also justifies the inclusion of the foreign trade variables in his estimations of the degree of implicit 
collusion in the Swedish manufacturing firms.  
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In his seminal (1964) paper on oligopoly theory, Stigler argues that firms in an 
industry form a cartel to enforce monopolistic conduct in a self-policing way. He argues 
that among the different methods of collusion in cartels a joint sales agency is probably 
the most effective, followed by output fixing and price fixing. The traditional theories of 
collusion emphasized the role of market concentration and the extent to which substitute 
goods are available in industries without entry to determine successful collusion. On the 
contrary Stigler emphasizes the role of secret -price cutting and how fixing market 
shares, if feasible, is likely to be the most efficient way of combating behavior that 
undercuts the cartel. Osborne (1976) in a static model proposes a reaction function 
equilibrium in which firms respond to changes in output by other firms in order to 
maintain their proportionate share of industry output. Friedman (1971) in a supergame 
theoretic framework also studies deviations by the colluding firms from the agreed-upon 
levels of output to detect cheating. 
But another models have been developed to show how some markets with these 
characteristics are not necessarily more conducive to colluding behavior. Geroski 
(1982) discusses the nature itself of the structure-performance approach. After 
demonstrating that conventional structure-performance theory does not generate 
conventional looking causal links, discusses the antitrust implications of this argument. 
First, antitrust policy is conceived as manipulation of the market structure in the hope of 
an amelioration of performance, but this view is not undoubtedly founded in structure-
performance models, and the model itself determines structure and not the effects of 
changes in structure. Second, while the model itself may not justify structural 
intervention, it may be used to guide it. It is more promising to derive rules from the 
data. Donsimoni et al (1984) also argue how concentration indices can be useful in 
assessing the state of competitiveness in markets. 
We have focused our discussion on horizontal price fixing or market sharing 
cartels. Vertical restraints are long-term contracts between suppliers and users to reduce 
the cost of their transactions. But vertical restraints may reduce demand variability as 
felt by suppliers and therefore exhibit lower market share variability. The argument is as 
follows. Variability in demand implies costs, there are three sources of demand 
variability suffered by a supplier: fluctuations in market demand, fluctuations in the 
market share of a customer, and fluctuations due to shifts in suppliers by a customer. 
Vertical restraints reduce the potential instability arising from the fluctuations in the 
price of the inputs, thus cost functions, and therefore the supply function are less 
unstable. That mechanism of stability is transmitted to the market shares.  
  6
We can conclude that the market share and its intertemporal variation may be a 
primary indicator of successful collusion for the firms in a noncooperative equilibrium 
framework. The firms in a successful cartel will have lower variability, ceteris paribus. 
We do not impose any assumption on the type of collusive agreement that firms may 
reach; therefore a whole spectrum of collusive models is included
5. Without a formal 
model, we identify structural factors that influence the stability of the equilibrium shares 
through the causes that disturb the short run equilibrium. The instability of market 
shares provides a measurable indicator of rival's behavior in oligopolistic markets. 
Stability indicates the completeness of the oligopolistic bargain process
6. If we control 
for all the relevant factors that perturb the equilibrium, an analysis of the determinants 
of market share variability provides a promising framework to understand how market 
structure affects oligopolistic behavior. 
The closest work to ours is the one by Caves and Porter (1978), Gort (1963), 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1976), Jacoby (1964), Mann and Walgreen (1970), and Ogur 
(1976) also supports the use of a measure of market share instability. Our approach is 
different in several ways. First, in the way we construct the measure of market 
instability. As we will show in section 3, it takes into consideration all the possible 
ratios of market share fluctuation between two periods among all the firms in the 
market. Second, our data consists of a panel of government-sanctioned cartels, thus it 
allow us to run an experiment knowing that a cartel was formed and then test for the 
instability of the shares. Third, we wish to approach the problem without imposing a 
structural model underlying the results. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the determinants of market 
share variability. Section 3 explains the construction of the dependent variable used to 
measure variability and its computation for the sample under stud, and the independent 
variables. Section 4 statistically analyzes the results. Section 5 contains the econometric 
results. Section 6 concludes and discusses the normative implications of the approach. 
 
                                                 
5 Stigler (1964) also asserts that oligopolists wish to collude to maximize joint profits. In the absence of 
side payments that might not be entirely true. There are actually many possible collusive prices between 
the non-collusive equilibrium price and the joint-profit maximizing one. The theory of repeated games 
has shown how we can find equilibrium strategies to sustain those prices. 
6 Stability should also be a characteristic of competitive markets. We expect that in highly concentrated 
markets firms are aware of their interdependence and consider it in their optimal behavior.  
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2.  Determinants of market share variability 
A variation over time of the market shares of oligopolistic competitors signals a 
disturbance in the short run equilibrium of quantities. In the new equilibrium some 
firms will have a higher market share than others, also some firms may exit and new 
ones supply the market. An oligopolistic model of equilibrium shares should be able to 
compile those factors and generate predictions over the way the market structure will 
evolve. A complete model of such complexity is not available but important steps have 
been taken in that direction
7. The lack of such kind of models forces us to establish 
taxonomy of factors that may explain why the observed market share variability is 
evolving in that way. A complete description should contain the following components: 
What are the exogenous disturbances to the equilibrium outside the scope of the firms? 
How is the transition from the old to the new short run equilibrium? What is the 
frequency of the perturbations to the equilibrium? How much is the scope of the firms 
to internalize disturbances? 
Let us consider first exogenous disturbances to the existing market structure. 
Exogenous disturbances that are reflected in industry sales variability may be the result 
of shifts in the demand by domestic or foreign consumers and/or changes in the cost 
conditions facing the firms. Demand growth and changes in the preferences of buyers 
are among the factors that shift the demand function. Entry of new competitors and exit 
of old competitors shift the supply function by changing the number of competitors in 
the market. In the absence of vertical coordination with input suppliers, a change in the 
price of inputs changes the supply curve by shifting the individual supply curves of all 
the existing producers. Investments in R&D shift downwards the cost function of the 
successful firms. Disturbances coming from foreign markets are typically outside the 
control of the domestic firms especially when we consider a small open economy. 
Multiproduct issues add further complexity since it is possible that some production 
processes can be switched to another line of product without relevant extra costs of 
replacing. 
The relevance of the exogenous perturbations for the study of the equilibrium of 
market shares can be analyzed under two perspectives. The first one is that the response 
of the firms to those disturbances may be asymmetrical depending on the way they are 
                                                 
7 For example Fershtman and Pakes (2000) for a dynamic model of cartel.  
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affected, thus leading to a new equilibrium. For example a shift in the preferences of the 
buyers toward an imperfect substitute good or an improvement in the technology of one 
firm will increase the market share of the firm that produces the good or innovates 
respectively. The second one is that even if the disturbance should a priori affect 
symmetrically to all the firms, the process of adjusting from the old equilibrium to the 
new one, may break down the oligopolistic understanding. An example is a decrease in 
industry demand, all the firms may be equally harmed from a contraction in the 
demand, but it is possible that in colluding markets the consensus breaks down if the 
firms cannot distinguish a period of recession from cheating by someone
8. If the firms 
have access to the same information and firms produce homogeneous products 
disturbances from the demand side can be treated as uniform. 
The scope for adjustment of the firms may be restrained by some market 
structure characteristics and the firms’ internal organization itself. The firms’ cost 
structure determines their capacity to respond to changes in the industry demand. If a 
firm operates in the neighborhood of full capacity or the marginal cost rises sharply at 
that level, we expect that the scope for adjustment to disturbances reduce significantly. 
The adjustment process takes time, if the firms are capable to take action quickly then 
the scope for adjustment in enlarged. 
Product differentiation has an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, product 
differentiation implies less than infinite cross demand elasticities therefore market 
shares will not fluctuate as much as if the product was homogeneous, there is a 
switching cost by consumers. On the other hand product differentiation induces firms 
more easily to break the consensus because of the effective market power. 
The institutional framework may play a significant role as well. The imposition 
of restrictions to competition under the form of regulation implies that firms may not be 
able to adjust to the equilibrium the way the will if those restrictions were absent. 
The theory of cartels in oligopolistic markets identifies conditions conducive for 
cartels to be more or less stable. Consider a cartel that maximizes joint profits. The 
agreement also includes some kind of cost-minimizing rule to split market shares. That 
                                                 
8 See the classic papers by Rotemberg and Saloner (1984) and by Green and Porter (1986). Whereas the 
former concludes that implicitly colluding oligopolies are likely to behave more competitively in periods 
of high demand. The latter concludes that collusion is more likely to be sustained in periods of high 
demand.  
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distribution will be revised in the event of some kind of disturbance. We expect that as 
the degree of completeness of the collusive agreement reduces the market share 
instability increases.  
Competition in other nonprice market variables complicates the cartel 
effectiveness to maintain the agreed upon levels of output. Firms may compete in non-
price and output variables to attract consumers, therefore maintaining the consensus 
becomes more costly, the completeness of the oligopolistic bargaining less complete, 
and instability raises. 
3.  Variables in the analysis 
The dependent and independent variables are drawn from a Swedish data set 
consisting of 99 products in the manufacturing industry covering the period from 1976 
to 1990, thus we have 1485 observations. The data comes from two different sources. 
The variables containing the type of cartel agreement come from the SPK, the Swedish 
cartel register, where cartels were publicly registered upon request. The rest of the 
variables come from the SCB, the Swedish Statistical agency.  
The data has strengths and weaknesses. We start with the strengths. The data is 
unique because it contains cartel agreements that were publicly registered, i.e. cartels 
were legal and very few exemptions were included
9. Furthermore it is quite 
representative of the overall Swedish manufacturing industry and has a time-series 
dimension that some of the previously mentioned studies lack. This fact allows us to 
observe the time pattern of the variables over a reasonably long time horizon. 
The weaknesses of the data stem from the fact that we concentrate on 
manufacturing industries where departures from competition are constrained by foreign 
competition. About the cartel register, it is apparent how some agreements may not have 
been registered, and some others may have been remaining in the register after their 
actual termination. Therefore some of the predicted effects of the cartel will happen in 
                                                 
9 The cartel legislation was in effect until 1993 when Sweden joined the European Union and the 
previously mentioned guidelines were adopted.  
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product-markets actually not registered as such, and absent in another markets in which 
they should. 
  Dependent Variable 
We continue explaining the way the dependent variable was constructed. 
Consider first the case when there are two firms with market shares S1t and S2t in period 
t
10. The following statistic, denoted as zt, measures the relative intertemporal variability 














To illustrate Zt if the relative shares of the firms over the two periods are 
constant, then zt equals zero. If there are more than two firms in the industry, one can 
use as the statistic of interest the average of all distinct pair-wise values of zt for each 
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Because we are interested in distinguishing cartelized from noncartelized 
























                                                 
10 If the firms sell homogeneous products, then we can equivalently use the intertemporal variation of the 
ratio of the quantities of the firms, q1t and q2t respectively, to construct the statistic, since the total output 
Q is in both the numerator and the denominator. That seems to be the case of the data since it has been 
selected from the SNI at the six-digit level.  
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By taking a product, and comparing the mean z over periods in which there was 
a cartel agreement with the mean over periods in which there was no cartel agreement, 
we have a basic statistical framework for testing the hypothesis whether the cartel 
agreement is associated with less relative market share variability
11. 
  Independent Variables 
Variations in the industry sales tend to destabilize market shares. If the 
fluctuations do not uniformly affect all the firms in the market, then big increases and 
big decreases in sales should be associated with greater market share instability. An 
exogenous perturbation in the industry demand provokes a shift in short run oligopoly 
equilibrium that requires a new adjustment of the consensus and may cause defection of 
the colluding firms during the process.  
Several studies find a negative relationship between market share (independent 
variable) and sales variability (one of the dependent variables)
12. Furthermore, they find 
a positive relationship between industry sales variability and sales variability. 
ISVAR: Absolute value of the change in the industry sales. The variable Rit 
includes both the supply by local producers and the values of the import in 












ln it ISVAR  
It is of interest to distinguish between downturns and upswings in the economy. 
If price wars are more (less) likely during periods of economic growth we might 
observe higher (lower) variations in the market shares of the firms during those periods 
as well.  
 
                                                 
11 We can also consider the inclusion of a correction for the initial size in the dependent variable to 
account for differences in the initial market share. We want to check whether there is a significant higher 
fluctuation in the dependent variable in those markets in which the initial asymmetry in the market shares 
is bigger. 
12 Das et al. (1993), Scherer (1970), and Mills and Schumann (1985).  
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GROWTH: Dummy variable that takes value one if there is an increase in the 
























Significant entry and exit of firms in the market necessarily perturbs the short 
run equilibrium. The existent barriers to entry regulate entry of new firms. Entry not 
only automatically decreases the market shares of the existing firms but may also upset 
the equilibrium by intensifying the best response efforts of the existing firms. On the 
contrary exit increases the market shares of the existing firms, therefore increases 
concentration and the best response effort of the firms is a priori easier. 
ENTRY: Dummy variable that takes value one if there is entry by one firm that 











EXIT: Dummy variable that takes value one if there is exit by one firm that had 











Import competition should increase market share instability. The effect is similar 
to that of entry by new firms. Foreign producers by selling in the domestic market 
introduce an exogenous perturbation that tends to break the oligopolistic consent by 
increasing the competitiveness in the market.  
IMPORT: Absolute value of the variation of the share of the imports from total 
domestic sales denoted as η it, i.e. including sales by local firms and imports. 
                                                 
13 We can alternatively use the slope coefficient of the log-linear regression of industry sales on time. 













ln it IMPORT  
It is a fact that there are market linkages beyond the national boundaries. The 
relation is quite complex. An average firm will sell to the domestic market and to 
foreign markets as well. Interdependence may be recognized less fully with foreign 
producers than local ones, especially when the exporting firms are of small size and the 
national market is concentrated. The presence of exports would be related with lower 
market share variability. There are two effects that operate in opposite directions. On 
the one hand market share variability may increase when tension among local producers 
is deviated outside the national boundaries. On the other hand exogenous perturbations 
may have the same effect as imports, decreasing market share variability. 
EXPORT: Absolute value of the variation of the share of the exports from 













ln it EXPORT  
We distinguish between vertical (V) and horizontal (H) agreements. The data 
contain two types of horizontal agreements, market sharing and price fixing. Vertical 
agreements are basically exclusive dealing contracts. We expect that market-sharing 
agreements reduce market share variability. If cooperation is successful firms will 
produce splitting the markets and trying to maintain their quotas. Therefore fluctuation 
due to more intense competition will be lower. Price-fixing agreements may have the 
same stabilizing effects on market shares provided that potential gains on cost reduction 
by any cartel member does not break the agreement. Vertical restraints associated with 
exclusive dealing do not necessarily have a special role in reducing market share 
variability, since it involves intra-industry coordination. The presence of both types of 
agreements does not a priori shed light on the effects on stability. 
HOR: Dummy variable equals one if there is any kind of horizontal restraint. 
HORMS: Dummy variable equals one if there is a horizontal market sharing 
agreement  
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HORPF: Dummy variable equals one if there is a horizontal price-fixing 
agreement 
VERT: Dummy variable equals one if there is a vertical exclusive dealing 
agreement 
BOTH: Dummy variable equals one if there is both any kind of horizontal and 
vertical agreements 
The only structural variable we can use is a rough measure of the variation in the 
capital intensity using the capital stock to the sales ratio as variable. The steeper the 
marginal cost curve, the closer to full capacity the production plant, therefore the 
expansion possibilities are limited. Share instability is negatively associated with 
capacity utilization. 
KSR: Capital intensity variation: absolute value o the logarithm of the yearly 












ln it KSR  
Variables indicating oligopolistic behavior are also included to consider for the 
high concentration in all the markets in the data. That fact partly reflects a small 
economy effect, by which only few producers can survive. But it is significant how 
cross-country studies reflect that the Swedish industry is remarkably concentrated. We 
measure concentration by the Herfindahl index, the sum of the squares of all the firms 
in the industry. Then we want to see the effect of changes in concentration on 
instability. 
HHI: absolute value of the logarithm of the yearly change in the Herfindahl 












ln it HHI  
Entry and exit are highly correlated with the Herfindahl index. If everything 
remains the same, entry should decrease concentration whereas exit increases it. Entry is 
in general more likely to be associated with low structural barriers and hence with lower 
concentration.  
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4. Statistical  results 
Table I provides with descriptive statistics of interest of the independent 
variables, namely the average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, and 
a brief description of the previously discussed variables to be used in the econometric 
analysis that follows. 
 
Table I. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
 
Variable Description Mean  Std  Dev.  Min  Max 
ISVAR  Absolute value of the logarithm of the ratio of 
the sales between two periods  0.032 0.024  0 0.175 
GROWTH  Dummy variable =1 if ISVAR is greater than 
zero  0.758 0.429  0  1 
ENTRY  Dummy variable =1 if there is entry of a new 
firm in the market  0.014 0.118  0  1 
EXIT  Dummy variable =1 if there is exit of a firm in 
the market  0.013 0.115  0  1 
IMPORT 
Absolute value of the logarithm of the ratio of 
import share from total domestic sales 
between two periods
0.072 0.189  0 2.672 
EXPORT 
Absolute value of the logarithm of the ratio of 
export share from total industry sales between 
two periods
0.051 0.058  0 0.786 
HOR  Dummy variable =1 if there is any kind of 
horizontal restraint  0.063 0.242  0  1 
HORMS  Dummy variable =1 if there is a market 
sharing agreement  0.045 0.208  0  1 
HORPF  Dummy variable =1 if there is a horizontal 
price-fixing agreement  0.129 0.335  0  1 
VERT  Dummy variable =1 if there is a vertical cartel 
(exclusive dealing)  0.075 0.263  0  1 
BOTH  Dummy variable =1 if there are both 
horizontal and vertical agreements  0.119 0.323  0  1 
KSR  Absolute value if the logarithm of the yearly 
variation of the capital to sales ratio  0.031 0.028  0 0.266 
HHI  Absolute value of the logarithm of the yearly 
variation of the Herfindahl index  0.029 0.088  0 0.693  
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The mean values of the dummy variables are easy to interpret; it is nothing but 
the percentage of observations with a value one. For example 7.5 percent of the 1485 
observations had vertical restraints to competition. To illustrate some the rest of the 
values consider for simplicity the case with two firms. Let's assume that the sales 
variation between two periods t and t+1 is equal to the mean, that means that if there is 
positive (negative) variation in the total industry sales then there is a 4.5 percent relative 
increase (decrease) in the market share of firm 1 relative to firm 2. 
Before we turn the attention to the dependent variable we want to emphasize 
how the Swedish manufacturing industry is highly concentrated. First, for the sample 
under study the average Herfindahl index is 0.40 and ranges from 0.25 to 0.74, in few 
cases it is even 1. Besides the number of firms is never bigger than 4. Second, entry and 
exit of firms seem not to have played a significant role in the evolution of the market 
structure; the table shows that during the entire sample period there were only 21 new 
entries and 20 exits of firms for a total of 229 firms, but the Herfindahl index remained 
stable over time. The correlation coefficient between HHI and ENTRY is –0.07, which 
means that even though it is negative, it is almost zero. New entry does not play a 
significant role in decreasing concentration. Third, there are markets entirely sheltered 
from international competition.  
We cannot underestimate the importance of the cartel variables. We proceed 
with a cross-section study of the cartel frequency and type by sector of production for 
the whole sample, using product-years as the unit of measure. Results are reported in 
Table II. The product-years are the result of multiplying the number of goods times the 
number of years the cartel existed. Three broad categories of cartel agreements are 
considered: horizontal, vertical and both types of agreements. Column 3 is the 
percentage of product years under any type of cartel agreement. The rest of the columns 
are the percentage of the product years under the indicated type of agreement. 
It is the case that 41 out of the 99 products have experienced at least one change 
in their cartel registration status. The table reveals that some form of cartel agreement 
covers 26 percent of the sample. The data allow us to distinguish horizontal (primarily 
price-fixing and market sharing contracts) from vertical (exclusive-dealing contracts) 
agreements. Around  40  percent  of  the agreements contain both vertical and horizontal   
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Table II. Cartel frequency and type by industry 
Product Years 
Sector 








Food 150  113  4.66  10.66  60 
Apparel and leather  60  20  0  33.33  0 
Wood and paper  135  54  11.85  13.33  11.85 
Packaging 45  23  0  28.88  22.22 
Chemicals 105  43  0  21.90  19.04 
Drugs and cosmetics  60  9  0  5  10 
Petroleum products  60  6  10  0  0 
Rubber 45  0  0  0  0 
Stone, clay and glass  135  19  14.07  0  0 
Metal 165  0  0  0  0 
Machinery 120  18  0  0  15 
Electronics 210  14  6.66  0  0 
Transport equipment  105  15  14.28  0  0 
Miscellaneous 90  47  38.88  0  13.33 
Total 1485  381  7.17  8.08  10.81 
 
 
restraints. Only two sectors of production, rubber and metal have not experienced any 
episode of cartelization during the period under study
14. 
A significant feature of the data is the concentration of the total cartel activity by 
industry, and particularly in the food sector with 37 percent. Considering the 
aforementioned fact that in the food sector some of the cartels were government-
enforced, it partially obscures the private costs of cartel enforcement. The wood and 
chemical sectors account for another 20 percent of the cartel activity. This feature 
reflects the tendency of the Swedish economic policy of protection towards those 
sectors traditionally important in the economy
15. 
The available data impose limitations on the types of agreements that can be 
studied. There are many cartels with different types of terms registered at the same time, 
for example we find simultaneously price fixing and vertical restraints, market sharing 
                                                 
14 But it is still possible that before 1976 those products had episodes of cartelization but already broke 
down by that time. 
15 An important exception is the ship building industry although it is not part of the data under study. That 
industry was traditionally very important in the Swedish economy with a world market share of 10 
percent in the 1970s (the second largest in the world after Japan) to almost its entire disappearance ten 
years later. See Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck (1994).  
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and vertical restraints, and the three together. The data do not contain agreements that 
are just market sharing, they come in combination with price-fixing and exclusive 
dealing. 
As long as the dependent variable is concerned, we use the real product sales 
(taking 1976 as the base year) of the firms as the proxy for the quantity, which is not 
restrictive since the products are fairly homogeneous (seven digit level in the SIC). 
Sales include export as well as domestic sales and there is no way we can distinguish 
how much go to the local market and how much go to the foreign market. Table III 
shows the dependent variable’s mean and standard deviation by sector. We distinguish 
periods subject to cartelization from periods of oligopolistic competition. We also 
consider a simple F-test for the significance in the difference of the means of the two 
groups
16. 
Table III. Means and standard deviations of measures of market share variability by 
sector 
Measure of Share Variability 
With Cartel  Without Cartel  SECTOR 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Difference 
Food 0.086  0.086 0.093  0.125  -0.007 
Apparel and leather  0.067  0.048  0.052  0.062  0.015 
Wood and paper  0.071  0.064 0.096  0.164  -0.025 
Packaging 0.059  0.087  0.078  0.081  -0.019 
Chemicals 0.094  0.089  0.061  0.079  0.033* 
Drugs and cosmetics  0.143  0.066  0.071  0.074  0.072** 
Petroleum products  0.176  0.120  0.061  0.068  0.115*** 
Rubber …  …  0.073  0.084  … 
Stone, clay and glass  0.063  0.051 0.114  0.100  -0.037* 
Metal …  … 0.096  0.170  … 
Machinery 0.045  0.035 0.095  0.088  -0.05** 
Electronics 0.119  0.161 0.084  0.095  0.024 
Transport equipment  0.057  0.045 0.113  0.146  -0.089** 
Miscellaneous 0.090  0.065 0.163  0.157  -0.073** 
Total  0.082  0.083 0.087  0.120  -0.005 
*Significant at 10% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
                                                 
16 We regress Z on a constant and a dummy for the cartel agreement by product, then run a F-test for its 
significance. This is just a simple test of structural change. Rejection of the null hypothesis means that 
there are no significance differences when cartel agreements were operating.  
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At an aggregate level there are no significant differences between the market 
share variability of the cartelized periods vs. the non-cartelized periods. At a sector level 
we can see that the frequency of significant negative differences (smaller mean market 
share variability for the cartel years) is marginally higher than the frequency of positive 
differences, which partially supports the postulated hypothesis. Furthermore the whole 
sample contains products in which there was no episode of cartelization, products that 
were covered by some kind of cartel agreement during the entire sample period, and 
products only affected by cartelization during some periods. 
We proceed in the same way by constructing the dependent variable mean and 
standard deviation for every product that was subjected to cartelization at least for five 
years. In the empirical work we use a subsample of 24 products. The data was chosen in 
such a way that there was a cartel agreement during some periods and no cartel during 
the others for each product. The span of life of the cartels under study ranges from 3 to 
12 years with an average of 7.5 years. 
Then we test for the differences in the mean under the two groups. Support to 
our hypothesis should be reflected in significant positive differences between the mean 
periods without cartel and with cartel.  Results are reported in Table IV (standard 
deviations are in parentheses). 
At an aggregate level there are no significant differences between the market 
share variability of the cartelized periods vs. the non-cartelized periods. At a product 
level we can see that the frequency of significant negative differences (smaller mean 
market share variability for the cartel years) is higher than the frequency of positive 
differences, which partially supports the postulated hypothesis.  
The table includes all the agreements without considering the changes in the 
economic environment before and after the mid-eighties, a period characterized by 
macroeconomic instability as pointed out before. This is why we require an econometric 
analysis that accounts for other determinants discussed previously. 
Finally we also construct the Z-statistic for a subsample of horizontal price-
fixing cartels since our conjecture considers these and market-sharing agreements as the 
agreements in which we observe lower market share instability. Results are reported in 






Table IV. Computation of the Market Share Variability Statistic by Product
♦  


















































Toilet soap  1976-1978 0.03 
(0.029) 
0.117 
(0.031)  -0.087** 



























































Electronic 1976-1987 0.028 
(0.018) 
0.087 
(0.066)  -0.059 




(0.075)  -0.004 
   ( z denotes average of z)  
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Table V. Computation of the Market Share Variability Statistic for Price-Fixing Cartels 













Mineral Water  1983-1990 0.201 
(0.27) 
0.048 






(0.021)  0.028** 
Soft Drinks  1983-1990 0.092 
(0.066) 
0.062 






(0.098)  -0.051 
Costumes of 
Wool  1976-1979 0.029 
(0.031) 
0.054 






(0.050)  -0.232* 





































At an aggregate level there are no significant differences between the market 
share variability of the periods with horizontal agreements vs. the periods without 
agreement. The descriptive statistical analysis does not shed further light on the issue. 
We proceed by considering the determinants of market share variability described 
previously. 
5. Econometric  results 
We consider a linear regression equation to study whether the choice of the 
organizational form of the cartel and the other exogenous determinants significantly 
affect the market share variability in the predicted way. We are not only interested in the 
sign of the predictions but also the magnitude of the effects. The regression equation 
takes the form
17  
                                                 
17The model was also estimated using the components of the demand, i.e. industry sales and imports, the 
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where Θ  is the matrix of dummies and X is the matrix with the rest of the independent 
variables. We also include time dummy variables δ t to account for time specific effects. 
We estimate the full sample model using a generalized least squares regression model 
with a correction for heteroskedasticity as it was detected by a White test.  
The estimation results using different sets of regressors and for the two sample 
sets discussed in the previous sections are reported in Table VI (next page). First, let’s 
comment the properties of the results. A Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of 
the joint significance of the regressors. The log likelihood value is higher for the whole 
sample than for the subsample. 
It is noteworthy that no matter whether we consider the whole sample or the 
subsample, horizontal price fixing types of cartel agreements are significantly 
associated with lower market share variability. These result supports our postulated 
hypothesis on the stabilizing effects of this type of restrain to competition. 
Regarding the other types of restrictions the results are not that clear. Vertical 
types of cartels do not significantly reduce market share variability and we can even 
observe higher instability than in their absence. Most of the agreements are exclusive 
dealing; these agreements do not necessarily reduce intra-industry competition and 
therefore coordination on market shares might not be part of the cartel objective. 
The results on the effects of the regressors classified as exogenous disturbances 
are not always as we predicted and they even depend on the sample we consider. 
Industry sales variability does not significantly increases market share variability when 
the whole sample is considered but it does it when the sub sample is considered at the 
5% or 10% level depending on the set of regressors considered. On the contrary 
economic upswings significantly increase market share variability for the whole sample 
but is not significant for the subsample. The result cannot just be explained by 
significant differences in the number of observation values for the two variables in each 
sample because indeed both have almost the same values. It is true that in both cases 
75% of the values of ISVAR are positive It seems like a plausible explanation is that 
shocks in highly cartelized markets (50% of the total product-years) tend to break the 
discipline and disturb the short run equilibrium independently of the type of shock. The 
adjustment to the new equilibrium implies that some firms will increase their market  
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shares over the rest. In the case of the whole sample, because the proportion of 
cartelized markets is much lower (25% of the total product-years) upswings are more 
likely to disturb the oligopolistic equilibrium. 
 
Table VI. Estimation results of market share variability
♦  
Independent 



























































































































GKSR    
-0.007* 
















Log likelihood  1303.106 1315.372 1319.629 460.9689 469.9507 474.7976 
Wald chi2  961.14*** 958.59*** 968.08*** 329.14*** 381.78*** 421.65*** 
♦ Standard deviations appear in parentheses below the coefficients. 
 
The behavior of the market shares when there is entry or exit depends again of 
the sample under study. EXIT is associated with a negative coefficient at 1% level of 
significance for the subsample regression. This result may indicate how exit by 
increasing concentration, lowers instability. The coordination mechanism is reinforced. 
But our estimation result in the case of ENTRY is significantly negative which is in 
conflict with our initial predictions. The negative sign of the coefficient of ENTRY is 
significant at 1% level only in the whole sample. This result is in conflict with previous  
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results in the literature
18. What are the possible explanations? We showed how the 
correlation between entry and HHI is very low, -0.07, thus entry does not lower 
foremost the level of concentration in the market, and thus it does not have a 
destabilizing effect on shares. A probit regression of CARTEL on ENTRY shows that it 
is positive, significant at 10% level, and the magnitude is 0.48. 
The effect of the foreign trade variables follows the predictions. GM enters with 
a positive sign significant at 5% level. Increasing import instability does not necessarily 
increase variability in market shares, but increasing import penetration does. Exports 
only have a significant effect in the subsample. GX enters with a negative sign 
significant at 5% level. Thus disturbances are directed towards foreign markets. Overall 
the effect of export is weak 
KSR and GKSR when significant, enter with the expected sign. The higher the 
capacity utilization of the firms the lower the possibilities to expand production 
possibilities when there are changes in the economic environment, therefore the lower is 
the instability of the market shares. But the magnitude of the effect is rather small. 
6.  Conclusions and policy implications 
We postulated that share variability fluctuates among markets with the 
exogenous fluctuations of the short run equilibrium, the existence and choice of the 
organizational form of the cartel, and the structural characteristics of the markets. The 
proposed variables significantly and correctly captured the predicted effects. More 
importantly we found statistical support for the hypothesis that the existence of 
horizontal price-fixing cartels are significantly associated with lower market share 
variability as compared to those markets in which such agreements were absent. The 
conclusion is robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables that plausibly 
affected market share instability. The result supports the idea that instability increases as 
collusion becomes less complete and effective. 
What is the normative relevance of these results? Market instability per se does 
not indicate the existence of colluding behavior, which is not the conclusion of the 
                                                 
18 See Caves and Porter (1978) and Gort (1963)  
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paper. A perfectly competitive market is precisely characterized by a low instability. 
Our recommendations are concerned with highly concentrated markets. Despite the 
limitations of the data, the results can be used as another tool available to antitrust 
authorities to call for a first approach to detect the existence of tacit collusion in 
industries with similar structure but significant differences in market share variability. 
That clearly implies that the authority should have at its disposal the required data to 
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